An after-action report released Thursday about the Eaton and Palisades fires details how the unprecedented January firestorms unfolded and the failings of L.A. County’s emergency response. It also lays out recommendations for changes and reforms.
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At a news conference Thursday, county leaders and one of the report’s authors repeatedly emphasized that there was no single point of failure that led to the deaths of 31 people and devastation, but rather, a number of failures caused by a lack of preparation, coordination and resources. Those shortcomings were amplified by extreme winds and fire behavior.
“It is clear we must clarify our protocols for evacuations and alerts. We must practice and train as a region even more than we already do. We must communicate early, often, and with one voice. We must invest,” L.A. County Supervisor Lindsey Horvath said. “And above all, we must act.”
County leaders said they are committed to making the changes outlined in the report.
“ I wish there was one specific issue that was identified in this report that could have changed the course of history. There are steps we can take to ensure we do better, and we will do exactly that,” L.A. County Supervisor Kathryn Barger said.
The report — compiled by the McChrystal Group and released more than eight months after the fires — found that county practices around issuing emergency alerts, specifically evacuations, are “outdated, unclear and contradictory.”
That, coupled with confusion about who has what authority around evacuation decision-making, "led to inconsistencies in preparedness strategies across the county and a lack of clear documentation and communication processes," the report said.
In addition, the report said, first responders using a variety of unconnected platforms and inconsistent practices struggled to share information in real-time.
“The extreme and rapidly moving fire conditions challenged the situational awareness of fire and law enforcement first responders," the report said, "making it difficult to communicate the fire’s location to the public. This was especially prevalent during the Eaton Fire, when wind conditions grounded aerial resources, including surveillance, almost immediately after the fire started.”
L.A. County Sheriff Robert Luna and county Fire Department Chief Anthony Marrone said at the news conference that if the fires happened today, they’d be better prepared. However, they also emphasized that the extreme nature of the blazes made them particularly perilous.
Delayed alerts
The report highlighted an hours-long delay between when L.A. County firefighters in the field who suggested evacuations for areas west of Lake Avenue in Altadena and when the alerts were sent.
They suggested evacuating residents from Altadena to La Cañada Flintridge just before midnight on Jan. 7. However, an evacuation order wasn’t sent out until 3 a.m. Jan. 8, according to the report. Those at the Unified Command Center did not recall the suggestion, and reported that the fire front was not moving west at the time, the report said.
According to the report, neither L.A. County Fire nor the Sheriff’s Department told the Office of Emergency Management to send out evacuation warnings or orders between 1:12 a.m. and 3:25 a.m.
Barger acknowledged the demands for clarity she has received from West Altadena and said they're valid.
“There’s no question that there were failures, but it was not one specific individual or one specific department that can have an off with your heads,” she added. “At the end of the day, we’ve got to accept the fact that it truly was the perfect storm for the way that the failures worked as it relates to the alerts.”
Other factors that complicated the delivery of alerts to residents throughout the event, according to the report, included the mountainous geography of where both fires were burning; electricity shutoffs or downed power lines that shut down cellphone towers, meaning they couldn't transmit warnings to people's phones; and heavy smoke that degraded signal strength.
Recommendations
The report recommends restructuring and increasing staffing at the Office of Emergency Management, updating emergency preparedness training and policies and upgrading obsolete systems, as well as investing in public education about emergencies.
Kevin McGowan, director of the Office of Emergency Management, said his agency is reviewing all of the report’s recommendations and has already begun to make changes, including hiring six new positions. Shawn Tyrie, partner and government president of the McChrystal Group, pointed out that at the time of the fires, the Office of Emergency Management had only 37 full-time employees. New York City, with fewer square miles and fewer jurisdictional complications, has more than 200, Tyrie said.
County officials repeatedly said that they were committed to making the changes necessary, and have already begun to do so in some cases. Including, exploring new incident management systems.
While he said he appreciated the report and media stories over the past eight months, Marrone said, “ the reality is that no report or review or article will accurately capture or reflect the absolute horror and tragedy that occurred and unfolded that night, the fire, the unprecedented winds and destruction, the lack of fire resources and the lives saved. But most importantly, the lives lost.”
Finally, Luna and Marrone said county residents need to commit to being prepared for emergencies, alert when they’re happening and responsive to evacuation orders.
“We need to better prepare people to recognize that you’ve got to be prepared all the time," Barger said. "And if there is a fire and it’s in your area, be prepared to evacuate.”
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