Take accountability and move forward.
Those were the two points Los Angeles Fire Chief Jaime Moore hit repeatedly when speaking with LAist’s Larry Mantle this week.
On taking accountability, Moore said hazardous conditions and decisions made before the Palisades Fire erupted a year ago meant “our firefighters never had a chance” to arrest the fire that killed 12 people and destroyed thousands of structures.
On moving forward, he emphasized that reform is already in the works.
“Things have changed since the Palisades Fire, and we're going to continue making big changes in the Los Angeles Fire Department,” said Moore, who was selected for the LAFD top job by Mayor Karen Bass in November.
Here are three takeaways from the interview, which aired on AirTalk on Tuesday.
LAist reporters break down LAFD Chief Moore’s interview
1. Staffing decisions hampered fire response
“We were behind the eight ball. We were trying to play catch up without the resources we needed. We didn't have them pre-deployed there. That's what really caused us to lose the number of homes that we lost.”
— Chief Moore, on AirTalk
The LAFD uses a so-called pre-deployment matrix to set firefighter staffing levels ahead of high-risk weather.
According to the department’s after-action report, however, staffing levels on the day the Palisades Fire began fell short of the LAFD standard for extreme weather conditions. The National Weather Service had warned of low humidity, high winds and dry vegetation, what it calls a “particularly dangerous situation.” It’s the highest level of alert the agency can give.
Despite the high risk, the LAFD report said the decision not to deploy more firefighters in advance was in part made to save money.
Moore said Monday that the department has updated its policies to increase staffing for especially hazardous conditions, but he said he doesn’t believe additional resources would have stopped a fire of the magnitude that leveled the Palisades.
To suppress that kind of fire, he said, the department would need to pre-deploy resources across the city’s vast geography — to places like Baldwin Hills, Franklin Canyon, the Hollywood Hills, the Palisades, Porter Ranch and Sunland-Tujunga.
Moore said the department has already made new policies to call for more resources when the Weather Service issues a “particularly dangerous situation” alert.
2. LAFD is mostly an urban firefighting department
“It's important to note that we are mostly an urban fire department. We needed to do better training as to how to work in this type of an environment.”
— Chief Moore, on AirTalk
Moore referenced a key finding of the after-action report regarding a lack of training in wildland firefighting, which contributed to confusion and struggles to effectively utilize resources during the fire.
Wildland fires pose a number of challenges that are different from what firefighters face in urban environments. Those include the need to coordinate a large number of resources over vast areas, all while dealing with fast-moving flames that can rapidly tear through dry plants and structures.
A key takeaway from the LAFD chief's interview on LAist
The department found in its report that fewer firefighters were trained in fighting these wildland fires in recent years and that “leaders struggled to comprehend their roles.”
Some leaders in the department had “limited or no experience in managing an incident of such complexity,” the report said. And some reverted to doing the work of lower positions, leaving high-level decision-making positions unfilled.
“What we're doing now is really furthering that training and reinforcing that education with our firefighters so that they could be better prepared,” Moore said on AirTalk.
3. Changes to the after-action report
“I can tell you this, the core facts and the outcomes did not change. The narrative did not change."
— Chief Moore, on AirTalk
Early versions of the after-action report differed from the version released to the public in October, a fact that was first reported by the Los Angeles Times. The Times also reported that Battalion Chief Kenneth Cook, who wrote the report, wouldn’t endorse the final version because of the changes.
Moore acknowledged to the L.A. Board of Fire Commissioners at a Jan. 6 meeting that the report had been watered down.
“It is now clear that multiple drafts were edited to soften language and reduce explicit criticism of department leadership in that final report,” Moore told the commissioners. “This editing occurred prior to my appointment as fire chief, and I can assure you that nothing of this sort will ever again happen while I am fire chief."
Some changes were small but telling. A section titled “Failures” later became “Primary Challenges.”
Moore told LAist that changes between versions “ made it easier for the public to understand,” but an LAist review found the edits weren’t all surface-level.
In the first version of the report, the department said the decision not to fully pre-deploy all available resources for the particularly dangerous wind event “did not align” with their guidelines for such extreme weather cases. The final version said that the initial response “lacked the appropriate resources,” removing the reference to department standards.
The department also removed some findings that had to do with communications.
One sentence from the initial version of the report said: “Most companies lacked a basic briefing, leader’s intent, communications plan, or updated fire information for more than 36 hours.” That language was removed from the final report.
LAist has asked the Fire Department for clarification about why these assertions were removed but did not receive a response before time of publication.
