Take Two translates the day’s headlines for Southern California, making sense of the news and cultural events that affect our lives. Produced by Southern California Public Radio and broadcast from October 2012 – June 2021. Hosted by A Martinez.
How hackers infiltrated the NASDAQ stock market
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Courtesy of Bloomberg Businessweek
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How hackers infiltrated the NASDAQ stock market
Cyber-security experts assumed that the financial sector in the U.S. was prepared to take on hackers. It was believed that they were safe and could prevent someone from infiltrating a financial system and wreaking havoc.
Four years ago, however, the experts were shown just how vulnerable we actually are when the NASDAQ was hacked.
Michael Riley wrote the cover story about the hacking and the subsequent investigation for Bloomberg Businessweek and he joins A Martinez on the line from Washington, DC.
Here's an excerpt, courtesy of Bloomberg Businessweek.
In October 2010, a Federal Bureau of Investigation system monitoring U.S. Internet traffic picked up an alert. The signal was coming from Nasdaq (NDAQ). It looked like malware had snuck into the company’s central servers. There were indications that the intruder was not a kid somewhere, but the intelligence agency of another country. More troubling still: When the U.S. experts got a better look at the malware, they realized it was attack code, designed to cause damage.
As much as hacking has become a daily irritant, much more of it crosses watch-center monitors out of sight from the public. The Chinese, the French, the Israelis — and many less well known or understood players — all hack in one way or another. They steal missile plans, chemical formulas, power-plant pipeline schematics, and economic data. That’s espionage; attack code is a military strike. There are only a few recorded deployments, the most famous being the Stuxnet worm.
Widely believed to be a joint project of the U.S. and Israel, Stuxnet temporarily disabled Iran’s uranium-processing facility at Natanz in 2010. It switched off safety mechanisms, causing the centrifuges at the heart of a refinery to spin out of control. Two years later, Iran destroyed two-thirds of Saudi Aramco’s computer network with a relatively unsophisticated but fast-spreading “wiper” virus. One veteran U.S. official says that when it came to a digital weapon planted in a critical system inside the U.S., he’s seen it only once — in Nasdaq.